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ABSTRACT
In two recent cases, children were shot by Border Patrol agents
across the United States and Mexico border. In one case, the Ninth
Circuit found the Border Patrol agent was not entitled to qualified
immunity and should pay damages to the teen’s family. However, the
Fifth Circuit refused to allow damages in the other case because of
concerns over national security. The circuit split raises questions over
separation of powers and how far the power of the courts should go
when deciding damages in cases involving transnational issues. This
Article discusses officials’ qualified immunity and its limits when
constitutional violations occur; judicially created Bivens damages;
and the circuit split over separation of powers concerns and fairness
to plaintiffs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tensions run high at the United States and Mexico border. Concerns
over drugs, crime, and illegal immigration at the border involve
national security and foreign policy, causing significant political
attention.1 A recent circuit split could bring attention to the judiciary’s
reaction to the border, as courts are asked to make decisions about
Border Patrol agents’ lability in cross-border shootings.2 But courts
already have a history of limited extension of these kinds of damages.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,3 the Supreme Court first recognized a damages-cause-ofaction for federal officials’ constitutional violations. Over the last fifty
years, courts have hesitated to find additional Bivens actions. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi4 as well as circuit
decisions in Hernandez v. Mesa5 and Rodriguez v. Swartz,6 add new
questions about allowing Bivens claims in circumstances arousing
national security concerns. This Article will discuss the history of
qualified immunity and Bivens claims, the discussions of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuit courts in deciding the Hernandez and Rodriguez cases,
and how the Court should resolve the circuit split.
Section II first discusses the development of qualified immunity to
eliminate personal liability when harm is caused in an official’s role
and the limits of qualified immunity. Next, Section II discusses Bivens
claims—the history and development of the “Bivens test” in a “new
context.” Lastly, Section II discusses how courts have applied the
Bivens test requiring (1) no other adequate remedy and (2) no special
factors counseling hesitation.
Section III discusses the benefits and drawbacks of allowing Bivens
claims. First, the drawbacks of allowing Bivens claims include:
1. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a
Constitutional
Clash,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Feb.
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html.
2. Adam Liptak, Two U.S. Agents Fired into Mexico, Killing Teenagers. Only
One
Faces
a
Lawsuit,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Aug.
20,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/us/politics/agents-border-killings-supremecourt.html.
3. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
4. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
5. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018).
6. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018).
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overstepping separation of powers concerns, unfairness to government
officials and ineffective public service, and exerting a burden on
agencies that may shift focus from pressing public issues to putting
more policies in place to protect officials. Second, the benefits of
allowing Bivens claims include: the judiciary acting, as it should, to
create remedies to constitutional violations, deterring federal officials
from violating clearly established constitutional rights, and fairly
providing remedy for constitutional violations.
Section IV discusses the circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits. Both courts’ determinations of special factors counseling
hesitation are discussed and analyzed. While the Ninth Circuit argued
that none of these factors were present, the Fifth Circuit said it was not
even a close case. Section V proposes how the Supreme Court should
act. This Section provides suggestions for a resolution that asks courts
not to refuse causes of action until “special factors” are fully
scrutinized and government officials are held accountable.
II. BACKGROUND
Federal officials are protected from liability by qualified immunity
unless an official violates a clearly established constitutional right.7 In
the absence of a statute allowing plaintiffs to seek damages against
federal officials, the Supreme Court recognized a judicially implied
cause of action under the Constitution itself.8 This is known as a
“Bivens claim.”9 To successfully bring a Bivens claim, a federal
official must violate a clearly established constitutional right and
damages must be the appropriate remedy—damages are appropriate
when there is no other remedy and there are no special factors that
counsel hesitation.10 The development of qualified immunity and
Bivens claims are discussed in turn.
A. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine that shields government
officials from suit for wrongdoing within the scope of their official
role.11 In 1967, the Supreme Court first decided officials were entitled
7. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
8. See generally Bivens, 403 U.S. 388.
9. Id.
10. Jordan Emily, The Essence of Civil Liberty: Legitimacy and Judicial
Oversight for the Targeted Killing of an American Citizen through the Bivens Claim,
47 U. MEM. L. REV. 887, 896 (2017).
11. Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE
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to qualified immunity in Pierson v. Ray.12 In Pierson, the Court
grounded qualified immunity in defense of good faith and probable
cause.13
In the last fifty years, qualified immunity has undergone judicial
revision and clarification “both small and large, to the substance and
the procedural framework.”14 In 1982, one of the greatest changes in
the doctrine came in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.15 Before Harlow, plaintiffs
could defeat qualified immunity in two ways—through a subjective
bad faith standard or an objectively reasonable person standard.16
First, a plaintiff could show an official’s actions were in bad faith if
the act occurred “with the malicious intention” to deprive an
individual of their constitutional rights.17 Second, a plaintiff could
show that the official “knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]”—an objective question.18
The Court in Harlow was concerned that the subjective standard—
questions regarding a government official’s motive—unnecessarily
kept insubstantial claims from early resolution.19 The Court decided
to eliminate the subjective question of qualified immunity. Thus, the
good-faith standard no longer applies.20 Further, the Court highlighted
additional policies behind qualified immunity that went beyond its
blanket “unfair burden” reasoning, asserting qualified immunity
protected against the “expenses of litigation, the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens
from acceptance of public office.”21 The Court also cited its previous
policy stating qualified immunity ensures public officials are not
deterred from taking decisive actions that are necessary to their jobs.22
Today’s standard for qualified immunity provides protection
“regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of
DAME L. REV. 1999, 2000 (2018).
12. See generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
13. Id. at 556–57 (“We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause,
which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action
for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under §
1983.”).
14. Michelman, supra note 11, at 2005.
15. Id. at 2003.
16. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 815–16.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 814.
22. Id.
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law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law
and fact,” as long as it meets the reasonable standard.23 Qualified
immunity protects officials in all cases except when an official violates
“clearly established” constitutional rights.24 If an official violates
constitutional rights, there is no protection from liability when it is
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.”25
Interestingly, during the revisions in the last fifty years, Congress
has remained silent on the question of qualified immunity while the
Court has modified the doctrine based on its own policy judgments.26
In 1987, the Court acknowledged that it had “completely reformulated
qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law.”27 Although the judiciary is not the branch to determine
policy, it seems clear that the development and continuation of
qualified immunity through court actions have been established based
on policy considerations.28
B. Bivens Claims
Bivens claims are judicially created remedies that allow individuals
to seek damages when federal officials’ conduct violates a
constitutional right and it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.”29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy against officials who
violate constitutional rights but only applies to state and local officials
and not federal officials.30
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied right under the
Fourth Amendment to sue federal officials for money damages.31 In
that case, Webster Bivens alleged that federal narcotics agents broke
into his house, searched it, and arrested him without a warrant.32 The
search and arrest were conducted in front of Bivens’s wife and

23. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
24. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
25. Michelman, supra note 11.
26. Id. at 2005–06.
27. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
28. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
29. Michelman, supra note 11.
30. Id.
31. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
32. Id. at 389.
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children, and the agents threatened to arrest his family.33 The Court
found this conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.34
The government argued that Bivens could sue for damages under
state tort law.35 However, the Court rejected state tort law as an avenue
of relief because it was an insufficient alternative.36 The Court found
that state law might be “inconsistent or even hostile” to federal civil
rights.37 The facts of the case could have allowed the officers to escape
liability under state law.38 The officers knocked on the plaintiff’s door,
requested entry, and were granted entry by the plaintiff.39 Under state
law, consent is a defense.40 Therefore, the Court found a federal cause
of action was necessary because state law was unreliable.41
Bivens had no remedy because there was no statutory remedy for
violations by federal officials and no torts remedies were available to
him. The Court reasoned that money damages were appropriate since
“[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy
for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”42 The Court explained
that “for people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”43 The
Bivens claim recognizes an implied cause of action directly under the
authority of the Constitution, not under an enabling statute.44 The
Court stated “where federally protected rights have been invaded . . .
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief.”45
To successfully bring a Bivens claim, courts require a constitutional
violation against a personal right.46 Since Bivens, courts are reluctant
to extend Bivens claims “to any new context or new category of
defendants.”47 A new context is present if the case differs in a
meaningful way.48 If a new context is present, courts apply a “Bivens

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 391–95.
Id. at 394.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
Emily, supra note 10, at 896–97.
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001).
Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 816 (5th Cir. 2018).
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test” to determine whether damages are the appropriate remedy.49
Courts have found that damages are the appropriate remedy when a
plaintiff demonstrates: (1) no other remedies and (2) no special factors
counseling hesitation.50 Some argue that these special factors have
grown so large as to dominate the way the court considers Bivens
claims.51
In cases asserting a Bivens claim, qualified immunity has gone from
its status as a total defense to an element—showing a violation of a
constitutional right—of the Bivens plaintiff’s cause of action.52 In
these actions, the plaintiff bears the burden of specific pleading to stop
a defendant from securing dismissal of the claim.53 A Bivens claim is
not available against a federal agency itself, but individual officials
incur personal liability.54 In a Bivens action, a supervisory official
cannot be liable solely on account of the acts or omissions of his or
her subordinates.55 In other words, the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply. Thus, a plaintiff must allege that the individual
defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation.
The next two sections discuss successful Bivens claims. Section 1
examines previously established Bivens claims and courts’ hesitation
to expand when a “new context” is present.56 Section 2 describes when
damages are the correct remedy—when there are no other remedies
for plaintiffs,57 and there are no special factors counseling hesitation.
58

1. Bivens Contexts
The development of Bivens claims in subsequent cases created two
additional causes of actions where damages are more generally
awarded.59 After the 1971 decision, the Court extended Bivens against
federal officials under other constitutional provisions—the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
49. Emily, supra note 10.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009).
53. Id. at 686–87.
54. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
55. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
56. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See generally Bernard Bell, Reexamining Bivens After Ziglar v. Abbasi, 9
CONLAWNOW 77, 78–79 (2018).
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Amendment60 and the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.61 Altogether, these three cases are “the Bivens trilogy.”62
Outside of these established Bivens claims, a “new context” is
present.63
The first extension, under the Fifth Amendment, was a genderbased employment discrimination suit against a congressman in
1979.64 In Davis v. Passman, Congressman Passman fired Davis
believing the position should be held by a man.65 The Court first
considered whether the stated cause of action was in direct reliance
upon the Due Process Clause, thus constituting a constitutional
violation of a personal right.66 The Court held that the Due Process
Clause did imply a direct cause of action.67
Then, the Court turned to whether damages were appropriate relief
for that cause of action.68 This step took further determination as the
Court first decided whether there was another adequate remedy.69 The
Court found that no alternative remedy existed because an injunctive
order of reinstatement was impossible since Passman was no longer a
congressman.70 Further, the Court argued that the judiciary is
equipped to determine damages because the federal courts have
experience “evaluating claims for backpay due to illegal sex
discrimination.”71 Next, the Court determined if there were any special
factors counseling hesitation.72 The Court found that a suit against a
congressman presented a factor, but it did not counsel hesitation
because awarding damages would not impede official duties.73 The
Court examined congressional silence as another factor.74 The Court
60. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979).
61. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980).
62. See Bernard Bell, Critiquing Hernandez v. Mesa: Contextual Assessment of
Administrative Law’s Potential as an Alternative to Bivens Remedies, 36 YALE J. ON
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 25, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/critiquinghernandez-v-mesa-contextual-assessment-of-administrative-laws-potential-as-analternative-to-bivens-remedies/.
63. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 816 (2018).
64. Passman, 442 U.S. at 230.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 236–44.
67. Id. at 243–44.
68. Id. at 245–48.
69. Id. at 245.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 245–46.
73. Id. at 246.
74. Id. at 246–47.
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rejected congressional silence as a factor counseling hesitation
because it reasoned that unless there was clear intent that Congress
meant to exclude alternative remedies when statutory relief was
unavailable, there is no factor counseling hesitation.75 With no
alternative remedy for the plaintiff and no special factors counseling
hesitation, the Court concluded damages were the appropriate
remedy.76 Thus, Passman became the second successful Bivens claim
because the cause of action arose from a violation of a constitutional
right and damages were the appropriate remedy.
Next, in 1980, a Bivens claim arising under the Eighth Amendment
was found in the case of Carlson v. Green.77 Carlson involved a
federal prisoner suffering from chronic asthma.78 On the day the
prisoner died, no prison official called a doctor to examine him even
though he remained in the prison hospital for eight hours.79 Here, the
Court focused on the Bivens test—whether damages were the
appropriate remedy.80 Carlson considered whether Congress provided
an alternative remedy, which was expressly “declared to be
a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective.”81 At issue was a possible alternative remedy under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).82 The Court found that the
FTCA, which allows damages for intentional torts committed by
federal law enforcement agents, is not a substitute but works as a
parallel remedy to Bivens damages.83 The Court argued that the FTCA
does not protect constitutional rights, and thus “without a clear
congressional mandate” the Court cannot find that the FTCA is an
equally effective remedy.84 The Court allowed Bivens damages in this
case because the Court found no factors counseling hesitation.85
Today, the Court no longer applies the “equally effective” remedy
requirement but requires only an alternative remedy.86

75. Id. at 247.
76. Id. at 248.
77. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980).
78. Id. at 16 n.1.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 18–19.
82. Id. at 19.
83. Id. at 19–20.
84. Id. at 23.
85. Id. at 19, 23.
86. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 678 (1987) (quoting Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)).
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The Bivens trilogy expanded the use of Bivens remedies. However,
since Passman and Carlson, the Court has mostly rejected Bivens
claims, describing the expansion of Bivens as a “disfavored” activity.87
The Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens damages “to any new
context or new category of defendants.”88 Overall, courts are cautious
to extend Bivens remedies to new contexts.89
A case presents a new context whenever it differs “in a meaningful
way from previous Bivens cases.”90 A new context can be present even
in a case arising under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.91
The fact that Bivens derived from an unconstitutional search and
seizure claim is not determinative.92 For example, the plaintiffs
in Abbasi asserted claims for strip searches under both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. However, the Supreme Court found a new context
despite similarities between “the right and the mechanism of injury”
involved in previous successful Bivens claims.93 The Court offered a
nonexclusive list of differences:
A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the
officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or
specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to
how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be
confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the
officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary
into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential
special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.94
When a new context is present, the court questions if damages are
the appropriate remedy.95 It is a two-part question—first, whether
there is another remedy available to the plaintiff, and second, whether
special factors counsel hesitation in creating the remedy.96

87. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).
88. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001).
89. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Remediation of Constitutional Harm
through Bivens Action in Immigration Context, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 201, § 16 (2013).
90. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 738 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ziglar, 137
S. Ct. at 1849).
91. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 816 (5th Cir. 2018).
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859).
94. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
95. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 915 F. Supp. 2d 314, 352 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).
96. Id.
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2. Damages as the Appropriate Remedy
Damages should be the only means of relief to successfully assert a
Bivens claim.97 First, to conclude damages are justified, courts
determine if any alternative remedy exists.98 If courts find remedies
provided by agency administrative processes, equitable remedies
available to courts, or federal statutory or state tort law damages
remedies, then Bivens damages are not appropriate.99 Going further,
lower courts have refused to extend Bivens claims even when no
alternative remedy exists unless the absence of alternative remedies is
attributable to legislative oversight.100
Second, courts consider special factors counseling hesitation.101
Recently, Abbasi clarified the concept of “special factors” stating,
“separation-of-powers principles . . . should be central to the
analysis.”102 The decision from Abbasi focuses “on whether the
Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to
consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages
action to proceed.”103 Thus, the purpose of including special factors in
courts’ determinations is to examine whether a judicial decision would
interfere with another branch. Courts fear that not considering special
factors “would create a remedy with uncertain limits.”104
III. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF BIVENS CLAIMS
There are functional reasons both to allow Bivens damages and to
abolish the remedy altogether. Because courts examine many factors
before allowing Bivens damages, successful claims occur in narrow
circumstances.105 Additionally, the Court acknowledges that

97. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 739 (9th Cir. 2018).
98. Emily, supra note 10.
99. Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2018). See, e.g., Torres
v. Taylor, 456 F. Supp. 951, 954–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (damage remedy was not
allowed even though there the fifth and eighth amendment rights were violated
because the court found the FTCA adequate); Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp.
945, 960 (D.D.C. 1978) (no damages allowed for employment discrimination
because Title VII adequate).
100. Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2012).
101. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 915 F. Supp. 2d 314, 352 n.25 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).
102. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).
103. Id. at 1857–58.
104. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018).
105. See generally Nicole B. Godfrey, Holding Federal Prison Officials
Accountable: The Case for Recognizing a Damages Remedy for Federal Prisoners’
Free Exercise Claims, 96 NEB. L. REV. 924, 937–38 (2018).
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extending Bivens is highly disfavored.106 So why have Bivens claims
at all? This section will examine both the drawbacks and benefits of
allowing Bivens claims.
A. Drawbacks of Allowing Bivens Claims
Allowing Bivens claims does have drawbacks. First, allowing the
judiciary to establish Bivens claims raises separation of powers
concerns because the judiciary seemingly oversteps into policy.107
Second, allowing Bivens claims may be unfair to government officials
and ultimately cause ineffective public service.108 Third, allowing
Bivens claims may exert a burden on agencies that may shift focus
from pressing public issues to putting more policies in place that
protect officials.109
First, allowing Bivens claims can infringe on the other branches’
authority because the judicial branch lacks authority to make policy.110
The judicial branch should not declare judgments that limit or overrule
the policy of the executive branch or Congress on complex and rapidly
changing matters.111 The political question doctrine is a function of
separation of powers that defines questions that are nonjusticiable.112
The Supreme Court itself found that some questions are political in
nature and are not for the courts to resolve.113 The political question
doctrine “excludes from judicial review those controversies which
revolve around policy choices and value determinations
constitutionally committed for resolution to . . . Congress or . . . the
Executive Branch.”114
When cases assert a Bivens claim, courts should determine whether
allowing damage remedies requires answering political questions.115
106. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
107. Id. at 1861.
108. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
109. Id.
110. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
111. Peter Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official Wrongs: The Need for
Bivens Suits in National Security Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1153, 1180
(2018).
112. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
113. Id.
114. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
115. See, e.g., Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court
found that the political question doctrine does not apply because the Wilsons did not
challenge any foreign policy or national security decisions entrusted to the Executive
Branch. While the case may have implicated national security, the lawsuit for Bivens
damages itself is not about national security in a manner that would preclude
jurisdiction because of the political question doctrine.
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For example, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the
subsequent war in the Middle East, Bivens claims were brought
against officials for constitutional violations, but courts recognized
that any questions relating to national security may present an overstep
of their authority.116 The Constitution allocates foreign affairs and
defense to Congress and the President, and they are beyond the scope
of the judiciary’s authority.117 Because courts have limitations when
policy determinations are required, Bivens claims should not be
allowed when damages would interfere with national security,
defense, or other affairs outside constitutionally granted authority.118
Second, allowing Bivens claims may be unfair to government
officials and ultimately cause ineffective public service.119 The Court
has expressly stated that qualified immunity protects against expenses
of litigation, the deterrence of citizens from taking public office, and
the deterrence of public officials to take decisive actions necessary in
their jobs.120 Denying Bivens claims may protect against these
concerns.
There is a recognition that constitutional law is constantly evolving,
and public officials cannot be “expected to predict the future course of
constitutional law.”121 Qualified immunity seeks to balance competing
values: “on one hand, government officials sometimes suffer no
personal liability even when they violate constitutional rights, [b]ut at
the same time, the threat of punishing an officer for violating
previously unknown rights could chill legitimate governmental
action.”122 Thus, not subjecting individuals to liability prevents the
high burden of asking officials to constantly keep up with every
change in the law and the threat of ineffective service.
Additionally, the Court has focused on qualified immunity’s
presumed ability to shield government officials from burdens
associated with discovery and trial.123 Because costs of litigation are
high, it might follow that officials conduct a cost-benefit analysis and
116. Emily, supra note 10, at 892.
117. Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1125–26 (2014).
118. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017).
119. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
120. Id.
121. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978).
122. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015).
123. Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2018).
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choose to protect themselves over the community.124 The Court is
worried that the threat of litigation and the cost-burden of litigation
will deter officials from seeking public positions.125 Officials,
concerned about the costs of damages, might encourage inaction by
officers to reduce liability costs.126
Third, on an agency level, the Court has pointed out that without
qualified immunity there is a danger of “the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues.”127 Officials and agencies should
have the discretion to make decisions, especially in areas of pressing
public issues, like security.128 Changing procedures to encourage
inaction in security or defense positions would be a dangerous result.
Not allowing Bivens claims and reducing the risk of litigation may
promote more effective performance of important service jobs by
individuals and agencies.
B. Benefits of Allowing Bivens Claims
Allowing Bivens claims does have benefits. First, the judiciary is
needed to create remedies for constitutional violations.129 Second,
allowing Bivens claims against officials may be an important way to
deter federal officials from violating clearly established constitutional
rights.130 Third, allowing Bivens claims serves the principle of
fairness—when someone is harmed there should be a remedy for that
harm.131
First, the judiciary should be the branch to create remedies for
constitutional violations because it has express authority to protect
individual rights.132 A Bivens claim recognizes an implied cause of
action directly under the authority of the Constitution, not under an
enabling statute.133 In creating Bivens claims, the Supreme Court used
the principle established in Marbury v. Madison, which states that
124. See generally John C. Jefferies, The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts,
99 VA. L. REV. 207, 244–46 (2013).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
128. Jefferies, supra note 124.
129. See generally Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution
as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
130. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
131. Id.
132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. (The source of the Court’s power to create remedies
is found in the language of article III: “The judicial power shall extend to all Cases
… arising under this Constitution ….”).
133. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
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when “federally protected rights have been invaded, courts will be
alert to adjust its remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”134
Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens, asserts that the judiciary holds
the responsibility to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.135
The judicial branch’s power allows the exercise of judicial discretion
within fair limits, particularly in cases dealing with individual rights
and fundamental issues.136 The courts have the constitutional power to
craft a remedy that includes “the power to define the contours” and to
define limits to the remedy.137 Allowing Bivens claims when
constitutional rights are violated is an appropriate remedy because the
judicial branch has express authority to create remedies.
Second, allowing Bivens claims may deter federal officials from
violating citizens’ clearly established constitutional rights because it
subjects individuals to liability.138 The Court has directly stated that
damages as a remedy are necessary to “deter future violations.”139 The
idea of allowing liability for general deterrence is present throughout
tort law.140 Allowing liability will force people to “take account of, or
at least to consider, all the costs of their proposed activity” and will
lead to “efficient investments in safety.”141 Allowing damages may
help encourage more mindful actions by taking into account costs
usually ignored “because existing legal rules do not provide liability
for those costs.”142 Because allowing Bivens claims would subject
individuals to liability, those costs can be used to deter future bad
actions.
While it has been argued that litigation imposes an unfair burden on
officials and may deter individuals from taking public positions,
evidence suggests that “the threat of being sued does not play a
meaningful role in job application decisions.”143 Additionally, a
survey of law enforcement officers found a number of respondents
believe that lawsuits do deter unlawful behavior and officers should be

134. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
135. Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
136. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221–22 (1961).
137. Michelman, supra note 11, at 2013.
138. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017).
139. Id.
140. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of
the Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2001).
141. Id. at 1031–32.
142. Id.
143. Schwartz, supra note 123, at 1804.
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subject to civil liability.144 Thus, it is questionable that individuals are
deterred from entering public positions, and some information
suggests a perception by public officials that lawsuits should be
allowed. Therefore, disallowing Bivens claims based on fears that
individuals will be unlikely to take public positions is likely
unsubstantiated.
Third, allowing Bivens claims serves the principle of fairness
because it provides a remedy when plaintiffs have no other options.145
Justice Harlan emphasized in his Bivens concurrence, “for people in
Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”146 Recently, the Court
reasserted the importance of having no other adequate remedy stating,
“if equitable remedies prove insufficient, a damages remedy might be
necessary to redress past harm. . ..”147 Under Bivens, when there are
no other means of relief, courts have recognized that plaintiffs should
be remedied for irreparable constitutional violations.148 It would be
an unjust outcome to leave plaintiffs like Bivens with no remedy when
the court finds their constitutional rights are violated. What would be
the value in the Constitution if the courts did not uphold its
protections? Allowing plaintiffs an avenue of relief not only helps
plaintiffs but also offers recourse against violations of constitutional
rights.
IV. SPLIT BETWEEN SPECIAL FACTORS AND FAIRNESS TO PLAINTIFFS
The Bivens test asks whether there are “special factors,” which are
usually concerned with separation of powers implications and whether
there is any other remedy.149 This test weighs the danger of special
factors against the unfairness of leaving plaintiffs without any relief.
Because special factors are not expressly defined, courts have applied
this inquiry inconsistently. This inconsistency is evident in the
following cases, which have caused a circuit split between the Fifth
Circuit and Ninth Circuit.150 The facts in the Hernandez and Rodriguez
144. Id. at 1812, n.99 (finding that 48% of respondents “either agreed or strongly
agreed that the threat of civil liability deters misconduct among criminal justice
employees” (citation omitted)).
145. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 409–10 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 410.
147. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017).
148. Bell, supra note 62.
149. Emily, supra note 10.
150. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 758 (9th Cir. 2018) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
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cases are remarkably similar, yet two different courts have applied the
Bivens test differently.
In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Fifth Circuit refused to allow damages
after a Border Patrol agent shot and killed a teen across the United
States and Mexico border citing multiple special factors.151 Shortly
after, in Rodriguez v. Swartz, the Ninth Circuit allowed damages under
similar circumstances because they found no special factor counseling
hesitation.152 The special factors discussed in each case were
separation of powers, national security, and foreign policy.153 While
the Ninth Circuit argued that none of these factors were present,154 the
Fifth Circuit said it was not even a close case.155 How did each of these
courts come to such different outcomes on special factors? The next
two sections discuss each courts’ analysis.
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Special Factors Finding
In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Fifth Circuit focused its analysis on
special factors counseling hesitation including separation of powers
concerns, Congress’ silence, and opening a new context and new pool
of plaintiffs.156 In Hernandez, a Border Patrol agent fatally shot Sergio
Hernandez, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national.157 At the time,
Hernandez was standing near a culvert that separates El Paso, Texas
from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.158 Hernandez and several friends had ran
up the culvert’s embankment towards the United States side, touched
the border fence, and ran back.159 Agent Mesa had fired a shot from
the United States side of the border killing the teen.160
In its opinion, the Supreme Court remanded Hernandez to the Fifth
Circuit after its decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, which refused to permit
a Bivens claim in a national security context.161 On remand, the Fifth
Circuit held that “[t]he transnational aspect of the facts present[ed] a
‘new context’ under Bivens, and numerous ‘special factors’
counsel[ed] against federal courts’ interference with the Executive and
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018).
Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 744.
See Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 818–19; see also Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 744.
Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 744.
Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823.
See Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 818–19.
Id. at 814.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017).
Id.
Id.
Bell, supra note 59, at 77–78.
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Legislative branches of the federal government.”162 The court held that
the case was not a “garden variety excessive force case against a
federal law enforcement officer.”163 The court considered these
special factors: (1) an extension of Bivens threatens the political
branches’ supervision of national security; (2) interference with
foreign affairs and diplomacy more generally; (3) Congress’s failure
to provide a damages remedy in these circumstances; and (4) the
extraterritorial aspect of the case as it aggravates the separation of
powers issues.164
After weighing the special factors, the Fifth Circuit decided it was
“not a close case.”165 Because “[t]he only relevant threshold—that a
factor ‘counsels hesitation’—is remarkably low,” the court had little
difficulty in holding that this was not a case for a Bivens claim.166 The
special factors are now considered.
The first, second, and fourth special factors mentioned by the
court—the extension of Bivens threatening the political branches’
supervision of national security, interference with foreign affairs and
diplomacy more generally, and the extraterritorial aspect of the case—
are separation of powers concerns. It is easy to argue this is a matter
of national security because Border Patrol agents are charged with
protecting the border. Since the political branches, and not the judicial,
supervise national security, foreign affairs, and diplomacy, the Fifth
Circuit was inclined to not interfere with the other branches.167 When
federal officials injure citizens from other countries outside of the
United States, these are diplomatic matters that are delicate in
nature,168 and the court asserts they “are rarely proper subjects for
judicial intervention.”169 While it seems well established that
Congress and the executive should supervise national security, foreign
affairs, and diplomacy, the court did not explain how allowing
damages for families will disrupt national security, foreign affairs, and
diplomacy.
The third special factor—Congress’s failure to provide a damages
remedy in these circumstances—speaks to Congress’s intention. The
court argues Congress’s intention is clear through its consistent and
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 818–21.
Id.
Id.
Margulies, supra note 111.
Hernandez, 885 F.3d 811, 819 (2018).
Id. at 819–20 (quoting, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)).
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explicit refusals to provide damage remedies for noncitizens injured
abroad.170 However, in the last fifty years, Congress has had the
opportunity to create a remedy or expressly deny Bivens remedies, but
it has been silent.171 Congress’s silence can be taken as acquiescence
because damages have been allowed in multiple contexts.172 Although
Congress has failed to provide a remedy and has specifically denied
damage remedies to noncitizens injured abroad,173 Bivens damages are
specific to constitutional injuries, and the judicial branch should create
remedies for injuries arising under the Constitution.174
Finally, the Fifth Circuit is concerned that Hernandez allowing a
Bivens remedy in this case would open up a new avenue to plaintiffs
like Hernandez, Rodriguez, and their families. However, in Passman,
the court dismissed the idea that the risk of opening the federal courts
to a flood of claims was a special factor counseling hesitation.175 The
court reasoned that courts cannot be closed because constitutional
principles should be more important than any reason to limit the class
of interests to protect.176
Although the Fifth Circuit cites many separation of powers
concerns, it does not discuss how allowing damages for the families
will disrupt national security, foreign affairs, and diplomacy. In this
case, the court’s safe decision demonstrates its deference to Congress
and the President by avoiding overstepping its role. Because the Fifth
Circuit found many factors counseling hesitation, the court refused to
allow damages.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Fairness Finding
In Rodriguez v. Swartz, the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on the
plaintiff having no other remedy and the need to deter federal
officials.177 In Rodriguez, a Border Patrol agent standing on American
soil, shot and killed a teenage Mexican citizen who was walking down
a street in Mexico.178 The majority extended a Bivens damage here.179
170. Id. at 821.
171. Michelman, supra note 11, at 2005–06.
172. Id. at 2012.
173. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823.
174. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
175. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).
176. Id.
177. See generally Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018).
178. Id. at 727.
179. Id.
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The court described the teenager as “peacefully walking down . . . a
street in Nogales, Mexico” and “without warning or provocation,
Swartz shot [him] dead.”180 The agent fired somewhere between
fourteen and thirty bullets across the border and hit him ten times,
mostly in the back.181
The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez upheld a district court’s denial of
qualified immunity because the official’s use of force was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment given that the teenager
was not suspected of any crime, was not fleeing or resisting arrest, and
did not pose a threat to anyone.182
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the majority reasoned that Bivens damages
should be extended because there was no other adequate remedy, and
there was no reason to infer that Congress deliberately chose to
withhold a remedy.183 The court held that Rodriguez lacked an
adequate alternative remedy because she could not bring a tort claim
under the FTCA, restitution from a parallel criminal proceeding would
be inadequate, and there was no evidence that Mexican courts could
grant a remedy.184
Next, the Ninth Circuit court argues there are no special factors
here.185 First, the majority argues damages in this case would not
interfere with government policies because this case involves standard
law enforcement operations and excessive force, similar to force seen
in other cases.186 Second, the majority found no issues with national
security but instead equated the case to other domestic law
enforcement cases when excessive force was used.187 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that awarding damages could not possibly interfere
with national security, and it is within courts’ authority to provide a
remedy for a violation of a protected right because the case did not
involve any special security risks.188 The court held that national
security concerns “could not be waved like a ‘talisman.’”189 The court
emphasized that it was not likely that national security involves
shooting people walking down the street.190 Additionally, the Ninth
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738–39.
Id. at 739–44.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 745–46.
Id.
Id. at 745.
Id.
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Circuit majority suggests that holding Swartz liable would
meaningfully deter other Border Patrol agents from acting in the same
way.191
The dissent argues—like the Fifth Circuit majority—that Bivens
should not be extended here because the case presents a new context
for a Bivens claim.192 Additionally, the dissent argues the court must
exercise caution in light of concerns about a circuit split and separation
of powers issues.193
The Ninth Circuit awarded damages because it did not find any
factors counseling hesitation and did find there was no other remedy
for the Rodriguez family. There is no other law to provide relief, and
there are no guarantees Mexican courts could secure damages. At the
core of the Ninth Circuit majority’s opinion is the reasoning that it
would be unfair to leave a family with nothing after a wrongful death
by a government official. Similar to Bivens, for these families, it is
damages or nothing.
V. COURTS SHOULD PROVIDE RELIEF
Courts should provide relief to plaintiffs like Rodriguez and
Hernandez. This Section provides a discussion for a possible
resolution, suggesting that courts not refuse causes of action until
special factors are fully scrutinized and government officials are held
accountable.
As the Fifth Circuit suggested, the special factors discussed in the
circuit split are not demonstrated to interfere with national security,
foreign affairs, or diplomacy.194 The Supreme Court should allow
Bivens damages in these cases because it is not clear special factors
counsel hesitation.
The Supreme Court must make a decision to resolve the circuit split.
As it stands, if someone is shot by a Border Patrol agent in violation
of a constitutional right across the border in California or Arizona they
have a remedy, but not if they were shot across the border by an agent
in Texas.195 Still, the Supreme Court is reluctant to make decisions
that could overstep into areas protected by separation of powers.196

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 746.
Id. at 749 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 745–47 (majority opinion).
Id. at 758 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2017).
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They will likely decline the cause of action in the Hernandez case
because the Court is not supposed to make policy determinations.
Plaintiffs and injured parties should have an avenue for relief.
Courts do have authority to create and contour remedies to address
constitutional injuries and should protect individual rights.197 While
courts disfavor expanding Bivens claims,198 courts still say new Bivens
remedies can be inferred,199 and the Bivens trilogy suggests that
extending Bivens to a new context does not preclude the court from
limiting its own extension.200 Allowing Bivens damages in these two
cases will not necessarily create a large expansion of damages, but it
could be an opportunity to provide guidance for lower courts by
defining the contours of Bivens claims in this context.
Next, the Court can address separation of powers concerns by
further scrutinizing whether special factors actually counsel hesitation.
By examining how allowing damages would actually affect these
“special factors,” courts can still show respect to the other branches
while finding the best outcome for plaintiffs. Courts can respect the
other branches while still exercising its power to protect vulnerable
interests. If plaintiffs are forced to wait for Congress to expressly
provide or deny redress, the courts allow individuals to be injured
without any recourse.
Additionally, because there is not a bright-line rule for defining
special factors counseling hesitation, courts have used discretion to
rule on different sides and inconsistencies persist.201 It seems that
special factors counseling hesitation have “grown so large as to
swallow the Bivens claim in many courts.”202
For example, in Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, a district court was asked to
decide a case arising under a Bivens claim for damages for the family
of a deceased teenager.203 In 2011, a drone strike unintentionally killed
Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi, a teenage United States citizen, not the
intended target of the attack.204 The family claimed that these officials
violated the Fifth Amendment rights of the decedents when they
197. Dellinger, supra note 129.
198. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
199. Id. at 1858.
200. Michelman, supra note 11, at 2012–13.
201. Constitutional
Law
―
Bivens Actions
―
Ninth
Circuit
Extends Bivens Remedy to Mexican Citizen Killed in Mexico by Cross-Border Agent
Standing in America. ― Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018)., 132
HARV. L. REV. 1096, 1100 (Jan. 2019).
202. Emily, supra note 10.
203. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014).
204. Id. at 58–59.
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authorized the drone strikes.205 The court had to decide whether
federal officials could be held personally liable for their roles in drone
strikes abroad when they kill United States citizens.206 The nature of
the case raised national security concerns and that factor alone was
enough to deny the claim.207
The court noted that the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the
Seventh Circuit have decided that “special factors––including
separation of powers, national security, and the risk of interfering with
military decisions–– preclude the extension of a Bivens remedy” to
cases like Al-Aulaqi.208 If causes of action are being refused for the
mere mention of issues related to national security, then the court is,
as the majority in Rodriguez suggested, waving national security
concerns like a “talisman.”209 While safety and security are important,
courts should be looking more closely at cases to determine if allowing
damages will threaten national security. In the Rodriguez and
Hernandez families’ cases, it seems unlikely that subjecting
individuals, who caused wrongful death, to personal liability will
threaten the safety of the United States and Mexico border.
Because holding governmental officials accountable does not
implicate national security in the circuit split cases, the Supreme Court
should provide relief to the Rodriguez and Hernandez families. Courts
should not refuse causes of action until special factors are fully
scrutinized. Separation of powers concerns are important, and courts
should not interfere with safety and security. However, courts should
find a connection between allowing damages and special factors
concerns before denying relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
With eyes on the border, the recent circuit split could bring attention
to the judiciary’s decisions about Border Patrol agents’ lability in
cross-border shootings. Disqualifying federal agents from immunity
could subvert agents to personal liability when they violate clearly
established constitutional rights during their jobs. While Bivens claims
are disfavored, they are still available to give plaintiffs relief when
they have no other means of remedy. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Ziglar v. Abbasi, as well as circuit decisions in Hernandez v. Mesa
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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and Rodriguez v. Swartz, have only added questions about allowing
Bivens in circumstances that even touch on national security concerns.
The history and development of qualified immunity and the Bivens
claim over the last fifty years has not created a bright-line rule to apply
to cases. However, the courts have developed the “Bivens test” when
“new contexts” are present. Applying the Bivens test, which requires
(1) no other adequate remedy and (2) no special factors counseling
hesitation, has given some guidance to courts. Still, courts have
discretion in applying the test and weighing special factors against the
need for a remedy.
There are both benefits and drawbacks of allowing Bivens claims.
The drawbacks of allowing Bivens claims—overstepping separation
of powers concerns, unfairness to government officials and ineffective
public service, and exerting a burden on agencies that may shift focus
from pressing public issues to putting more policies in place to protect
officials—value federal officials and not overreaching separation of
powers. The benefits of allowing Bivens claims—the judiciary acting
to create remedies to constitutional violations, deterring federal
officials from violating clearly established constitutional rights, and
fairly providing remedy for constitutional violations—values
plaintiffs and constitutional rights.
The circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits demonstrates
how courts consider the Bivens test differently and what each court
values more. While the Ninth Circuit argued that none of these factors
were present, the Fifth Circuit said it was not even a close case. The
circuits’ discussion of special factors suggests the Supreme Court
needs to make a decision on which special factors counsel hesitation.
Courts should not refuse causes of action until “special factors” are
fully scrutinized and justify courts’ hesitation.

